Afghanistan, The Soviet Union, Vietnam and the impossibility of winning a guerilla war or Mr Obama, is the American Government going to ignore the Powel Doctrine yet again ?

Posted: May 1, 2009 in Articles
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Part 1 of 6 in a series on Obama and the war on Terror.

obama President Obama has recently reaffirmed his belief that the USA should increase its presence in Afghanistan.  The purpose thereof is to disarm and obstruct and ultimately eradicate Al Quaeda.

He said, “This is not simply an American problem — far from it …it is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to al-Qaida and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it, too, is likely to have ties to al-Qaida’s leadership in Pakistan.”

The president added: “The safety of people around the world is at stake.”

Very true words indeed.

This is he points out, in response to the terrible failure of the Bush Administration who focused on Iraq. The world should in his option focus on Afghanistan, and its border with Pakistan.

Now, while I agree with the sentiment, entirely, I am not so sure that the Invasion of Iraq was as much of a failure in the war on terror as Obama suggests, I do believe that the implementation thereof was deeply flawed though, so perhaps we arrive at the same conclusion via different routes.

The problem with the Obama plan is the same problem that plagued Vietnam, and the very same one that led to the Soviet Union seeing Afghanistan as their own “Vietnam”.

What we are talking about here is the impossibility of winning a guerrilla war on foreign soil.

So Obama sends another 4000 troops to fight a war in tough terrain, against a war machine that has not been defeated there by massive military might for decades now.

Under Soviet guidance, the DRA armed forces were built up to an official strength of 302,000 in 1986. To minimize the risk of a coup d’état, they were divided into different branches, each modeled on its Soviet counterpart. The ministry of defense forces numbered 132,000, the ministry of interior 70,000 and the ministry of state security (KHAD) 80,000.

 taliban islamistThe mujahideen favoured sabotage operations. The more common types of sabotage included damaging power lines, knocking out pipelines and radio stations, blowing up government office buildings, air terminals, hotels, cinemas, and so on. From 1985 through 1987, an average of over 600 “terrorist acts” a year were recorded. In the border region with Pakistan, the mujahideen would often launch 800 rockets per day. Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out over 23,500 shelling attacks on government targets. The mujahideen surveyed firing positions that they normally located near villages within the range of Soviet artillery posts, putting the villagers in danger of death from Soviet retaliation. The mujahideen used land mines heavily. Often, they would enlist the services of the local inhabitants, even children.

They concentrated on both civilian and military targets, knocking out bridges, closing major roads, attacking convoys, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, and attacking police stations and Soviet military installations and air bases. They assassinated government officials and PDPA members, and laid siege to small rural outposts. In March 1982, a bomb exploded at the Ministry of Education, damaging several buildings. In the same month, a widespread power failure darkened Kabul when a pylon on the transmission line from the Naghlu power station was blown up. In June 1982 a column of about 1,000 young communist party members sent out to work in the Panjshir valley were ambushed within 30 km of Kabul, with heavy loss of life. On September 4, 1985, insurgents shot down a domestic Bakhtar Airlines plane as it took off from Kandahar airport, killing all 52 people aboard.

Mujahideen groups used for assassination had three to five men in each. After they received their mission to kill certain government officials, they busied themselves with studying his pattern of life and its details and then selecting the method of fulfilling their established mission. They practiced shooting at automobiles, shooting out of automobiles, laying mines in government accommodation or houses, using poison, and rigging explosive charges in transport.

In May 1985, the seven principal rebel organizations formed the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance to coordinate their military operations against the Soviet army. Late in 1985, the groups were active in and around Kabul, unleashing rocket attacks and conducting operations against the communist government. – Wikipedia

y189703107894020By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced it would start withdrawing its forces.

The reason I quote that is to prelude my point and my question to Mr. Obama. The simple reality is that the war to be fought now, is much the same as the war fought then.

The lesson that history teaches over and over again is simple, you cannot fight and win a guerilla war on foreign soil, and even less on such treacherous soil, against such a well oiled, experienced and fanatical army.

My question is, “Have you forgotten your history, Sir?” If you think the Iraq war was difficult, this one sir, will make that one look like a walk in the park.

My firm belief is that the greatest failure in the War on Terror in Iraq was simple; they failed to consider the Powel doctrine. Which laid out 6 questions:

1)   Is A Vital US Interest At Stake?

2)   Will We Commit Sufficient Resources To Win?

3)   Are Our Objectives Clearly Defined?

4)   Will We Sustain the Commitment?

5)   Is There A Reasonable Expectation that the Public and Congress Will Support the Operation

6)   Have we exhausted our other options?

The points that I would like to raise in this context are 2 and then 4.

As regard 2, there are 2 options. One, you go in hard, really, really hard, you commit now and you finish the job, and you do it to the end. Or two, you slowly send your troops in to die over the next ten years fighting in mountains without any hope of real success.

Its clear which one Bush chose, and it came back to haunt in him in terms of (4), which is exactly what will happen if Obama plays pussyfoot in the Afghan mountains.

So the very simple point of this piece is, do you; believe that Obama is right when he says

“It is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order.”

And

“The safety of people around the world is at stake.”

american_flag If so, then put your money where your mouth is. The US can flatten this threat militarily, if it is prepared to deal with it with the requisite force.

“What force is that,” you ask.

Whatever it takes, but not a guerrilla war, history has already taught us, that is exactly what it doesn’t take.

 

Did George Bush leave one of his old speeches in the Resolute Desk? As President Obama unveiled his Afghanistan-Pakistan policy Friday, it was hard to miss the echoes of his predecessor’s “surge” strategy in Iraq. Indeed, says James Dobbins, the State Department veteran who served as President Bush’s first envoy to Afghanistan, Obama’s plan is “largely an extension of where the Bush Administration, in its last years, was heading,with some refinements and additions.”- Bobby Ghosh – Time Magazine

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